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NO "DOUBLE-DIPPING" ALLOWED:
AN ANALYSIS OF WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC.
v. UNITED MEXICAN STATES AND THE
ARTICLE 1121 WAIVER REQUIREMENT FOR
ARBITRATION UNDER CHAPTER 11 OF
NAFTA
Jacob S. Lee*
INTRODUCTION
The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
executed in 1992 by the United States, Canada, and Mexico,' is a
multifaceted instrument that contains many economic, political, and
social attributes.2 Arguably, one of its most notable and innovative
features is its framework for the resolution of investment disputes set
forth in Chapter 11.1 Chapter 11 dispute resolution gives private
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. This is dedicated to my
wife, Jannis, who teaches me the meaning of patience, sacrifice, and fortitude each
day in her struggles to learn a new language, understand a new culture, and adopt a
new lifestyle here in the United States. As always, I am grateful to Mom, Dad, Jason,
Danny and my friends for their unwavering love and support and for serving as a
constant reminder that while success in law school remains important, it is only
secondary to the greater, lifelong pursuit of bettering oneself as a person. I would
also like to thank Professor Victor Essien for his wonderful insight and guidance on
this topic.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 8, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [NAFTA].
2. Some viewed the NAFTA as a prime opportunity and mechanism to promote
employment and economic growth in each country by "maximizing trade and
investment opportunities and enhancing the competitiveness of their firms in the
global marketplace." Justine Daly, Has Merico Crossed the Border on State
Responsibility for Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo
Clause in Mexico After the NAFTA, 25 St. Mary's L.J. 1147, 1152 (1994). But see
Sharon D. Fitch, Dispute Settlement Under the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Will the Politica4 Cultural and Legal Differences Between the United States and
Mexico Inhibit the Establishment of Fair Dispute Settlement Procedures?, 22 Cal. W.
Int'l L.J. 353, 377 (1992) (criticizing the NAFTA as embodying just the -latest
attempt to exercise political hegemony over Mexico," which would ultimately result
in a loss of Mexican national sovereignty).
3. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1115,32 I.LM. at 642. See David A. Gantz,
Resolution of Investment Disputes Under the North American Free Trade Agreement,
10 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 335, 335 (1993) ("Of the many remarkable achievements
of the governments of Mexico, the United States and Canada in concluding the North
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investors of each NAFTA Party the unprecedented right to directly
access dispute settlement proceedings against host countries allegedly
in breach of the NAFTA provisions.4 In so doing, Chapter 11 ensures
investors doing business in the NAFTA States an efficient mechanism
for the settlement of disputes based on international standards, thus
reducing the need for investors to resort to the vast uncertainties of
litigating in the local forums.5 Most significantly, the framework for
dispute resolution under Chapter 11 marks the end of decades of
political strife between the United States and Mexico in the arena of
foreign investment policy.6
Traditionally, the United States held suspicions and doubts about
the political stability and soundness of the internal legal system of
Mexico7 and emphasized international law principles when dealing
American Free Trade Agreement ('NAFFA'), few are as significant as the framework
that has been created for the resolution of investment disputes."); see also Hope H.
Camp. Jr., Dispute Resolution and U.S.-Mexico Business Transactions, 5 U.S.-Mex.
L.J. 85, 85 (1997) [hereinafter Camp, Dispute Resolution] (characterizing the dispute
resolution mechanism as an integral part of the NAFTA and commenting that
binding arbitration, in general, "provides the best opportunity for a fair process, an
efficient ruling, and a just outcome"); Donald S. Macdonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA:
What Are the Implications for Sovereignty?, 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 281, 281 (1998)
("Arguably the most innovative feature of the NAFTA investment provisions... is
the establishment of dispute settlement processes based on arbitration according to
international arbitral rules .... ").
4. See MacDonald, supra note 3, at 281; Cherie O'Neal Taylor, Dispute
Resolution as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and an Agent for Deepening
Integration: NAFTA and MERCOSUR?, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 850, 875 (1996-97)
(describing Chapter 11 as the only section which does not limit participation in
dispute resolution to NAFTA Parties). Private individuals do enjoy some limited
forms of indirect access to dispute resolution processes under other sections of the
NAFTA governing dispute resolution in other matters (e.g., Chapter 20 with regard
to general disputes and Chapter 19 involving antidumping and countervailing duty).
See Taylor, supra, at 875-76.
5. See Jonathan I. Miller, Comment, Prospects for Satisfactory Dispute
Resolution of Private Commercial Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 21 Pepp. L. Rev. 1313, 1361 (1994) (referring to binding arbitration as a
means to reduce uncertainty inherent in doing business based on markedly different
legal systems between the United States and Mexico). One scholar identifies many
reasons why foreign businessmen in the United States and Mexico wish to avoid local
litigation regarding their investment interests, including: 1) unpredictability of
enforcing judgments; 2) local bias; 3) lack of confidentiality; 4) lack of technical
expertise of the jury; and 5) economic and time costs of litigation in the local courts.
Hope H. Camp, Jr., Binding Arbitration: A Preferred Alternative for Resolving
Commercial Disputes Between Mexican and U.S. Businessmen, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 717,
724 (1991) [hereinafter Camp, Binding Arbitration].
6. See Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter:
Substantive Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 Int'l Law. 727, 736 (1993)
(praising Chapter 11 for uniting "two countries-Mexico and the United States-that
have for decades sat on opposite sides of an ideological divide on such fundamental
issues as expropriation, dispute settlement, and government control over foreign
investment"). For an extensive discussion on the differing policies of the United
States and Mexico with respect to foreign investment that persisted before the
NAFTA and Chapter 11, see infra Part I.A.
7. See Gantz, supra note 3, at 336-37 ("There is surely great irony in the fact that
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with developing countries in general.' In contrast, Mexico adamantly
practiced a general policy, common among developing countries,
against entertaining any legal frameworks that presented even the
slightest threat to its "full sovereignty" over the treatment of foreign
investments located in its territories.9 By guaranteeing investors
direct access to international forums for the resolution of disputes
with the NAFTA States, Chapter 11 represents a revolutionary
compromise between the two countries with regard to foreign
investment.
Despite the many advantages afforded to investors who submit
claims under the dispute resolution mechanism in Chapter 11,
procedural difficulties accompany the actual feat of initiating NAFTA
proceedings. Specifically, Article 1121 of NAFTA obligates any
claimant under Chapter 11 to satisfy two conditions precedent before
engaging in arbitration pursuant to Chapter 11.'" One of the
conditions, which is the focus of this Note, requires the claimant to
waive his or her right "to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party, or other
dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the
measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach" of
NAFTA.n1 In short, the Article 1121 waiver protects against claimants
"double-dipping" and maintaining cases in two different forums
simultaneously with respect to the same measures that allegedly
caused them injuries.
While on its face, the waiver provision seems harmless and even
favorable in serving a legitimate policy purpose against the
the most comprehensive framework for the settlement of investment disputes ever
embodied in a multilateral agreement is incorporated in an agreement in which
Mexico and the United States are the leading parties.").
8. See Gloria L. Sandrino, The Nafta Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 Vand. J. Transnat'l L 259, 263
(1994) (discussing the emphasis placed on traditional international law principles by
the United States and other industrialized nations on behalf of their citizens operating
in developing countries whose investments could otherwise be subject to national
domination and control); see also infra Part I.A.1 for a discussion of the rationale
behind the United States' paternalistic view generally towards its citizens doing
business abroad and, in particular, its rigid stance against subjecting its citizens blindly
to Mexican jurisdiction in the adjudication of investment disputes.
9. Sandrino, supra note 8, at 263 (stating that developing countries, in general,
asserted their right as sovereigns in the treatment of foreign investment within their
territories and strongly resisted traditional notions of international law). For further
discussion on Mexico's rigid stance of absolute sovereignty when dealing with foreign
investors, see infra Part I.A.2.
10. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1121,32 I.L.M. at 643 (providing certain
formal and substantive conditions precedent to NAFTA arbitration under Chapter
11).
11. Id. The other condition precedent to arbitration under Chapter 11 is that the
aggrieved investor submit a written consent to arbitration under the provisions of the
NAFTA. Id
2001] 2657
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duplication of proceedings, 2 a closer review of the provision reveals
latent defects related to its application. Because Article 1121
functions as a condition precedent to NAFTA arbitration, 3 an arbitral
tribunal invoked under Chapter 11 necessarily would have to make a
preliminary determination as to the sufficiency of any waiver
submitted pursuant to the provision before allowing the claimant to
proceed to the merits of his or her case. A problem arises, however,
when the tribunal summarily decides on the validity of the waiver
under Article 1121 without considering the merits of the claims made
by the aggrieved investor. Many claims, while actionable under the
local laws, may very well be determined later to fall short of
constituting actionable claims under NAFTA. 4 If the arbitral tribunal
finds that such claims do not rise to the level of stating NAFTA causes
of action, the investor would have no alternative recourse even in the
local courts as to such claims, having already waived his or her rights
to subsequent litigation under Article 1121. As such, the Article 1121
waiver essentially forces investors seeking to invoke NAFTA
arbitration to bear significant opportunity costs in having to waive
their rights prospectively as to subsequent local litigation of claims
which they have no assurance will eventually be heard by the NAFTA
tribunal.
A recent case on point, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican
States,15 provides a clear illustration of such dangers inherent in the
application of the Article 1121 waiver. In Waste Management, a
United States-based investor, Waste Management, Inc., raised claims
against the United Mexican States under Article 1110, governing
expropriation,"6 and Article 1105, governing unequal and inequitable
12. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 15 ICSID
Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. 214, 235-36 (2000) (discussing the imminent danger in
allowing parallel proceedings, specifically that the claimant might seek "double
benefit in its claim for damages"), available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/cases/awards.htm.
13. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1121, 32 1.L.M. at 643.
14. See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 244-45
(Highet, Arb., dissenting) (arguing that measures of breach of contract did not
constitute sufficient bases for a claim for expropriation under the NAFTA because
they were merely creatures of local commercial law and not connected to
international obligations); Azinian v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 14 ICSID
Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. 538, 564-65 (1999) (holding that damages incurred by
the claimant resulting from breach of contract did not constitute grounds for a claim
for expropriation under the NAFTA). For a full discussion on the substantive
sufficiency of breaches of contract in stating legitimate claims for expropriation in
general, see infra Part III.A.
15. 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 214.
16. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. at 641-42. The term
"expropriation" refers to an inappropriate "taking" by the host country of the
property or investment of a citizen of another country. See Restatement (Third) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712 (1987) ("A [S]tate is responsible
under international law for injury resulting from: (1) a taking by the [S]tate of the
property of a national of another [SItate that (a) is not for a public purpose, or (b) is
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treatment of investors in the host country.'7 The underlying issues
upon which the claims were based involved the alleged breaches of a
concession agreement18 and a line of credit agreement 9 made with
Waste Management by certain Mexican entities. Before initiating the
NAFTA arbitration, Waste Management had already begun pursuing
these claims in the local forums.' Without inquiring into the merits of
Waste Management's claims under NAFTA, 21 the arbitral majority
ruled that Waste Management had a duty under Article 1121 to
discontinue its local proceedings because they addressed the same
measures alleged to be breaches of NAFTA.? The majority,
therefore, deemed Waste Management's refusal to discontinue its
local proceedings to be conduct violating Article 1121.1 By its terms,
the waiver drafted and tendered by Waste Management appeared to
facilitate such conduct,24 and the majority rejected it as non-compliant
discriminatory, or (c) is not accompanied by provision for just compensation....").
Alternatively, "expropriation" has also been held to consist of a substantial
"deprivation" by the host State of the investor's interest in his or her investment or
property. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
term "expropriation" as interpreted and applied by various arbitral tribunals.
17. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at 639-40; Waste Mgmt., 15
ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 216-17.
18. A "traditional concession agreement" gave foreign investors "almost
unrestricted rights" to extract, process, and market natural resources located in a
designated area of land in the host country. Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration and
Renegotiation of International Investment Agreements 7 (2d rev. and enlarged ed.
1995). In exchange for these rights, "[tihe host country received royalties on the
volume of [resources exploited by the investors] and possibly indirect benefits
through employment of its local labour force." Id. at 20. More recently, joint-venture
agreements have grown to replace these traditional concessions as the dominant form
of investment tool where the host country actively functions as co-ownmer of the
investment, thereby maintaining control over its natural resources from a political
standpoint and safeguarding its interests from an economic standpoint. See id. at 20-
21.
19. A "line of credit" agreement is made between a lender, typically a bank, and a
borrower "whereby the [lender] agrees to lend... funds up to a previously agreed
maximum amount," which may be terminated if the financial status of the borrower
deteriorates. Lewis E. Davids, Dictionary of Banking and Finance 129 (1978).
20. Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment Li. at 222-23.
21. Id. at 235 (disregarding the merits of the claims submitted in evaluating the
Article 1121 waiver since the waiver was a condition precedent to arbitration, and
therefore, the issues surrounding the waiver were only preliminary in character).
22. See id. at 237.
23. See id. at 233-38.
24. The waiver submitted by Waste Management contained suspicious language
seemingly constructed to allow Waste Management to engage in duplicate
proceedings with regard to the same alleged acts of wrongdoing: "[W1aiver does not
apply to any dispute settlement proceedings involving allegations that Respondent has
violated duties imposed by sources of law other than Chapter Eleven of NAFTA ...."
Id. at 234. These qualifications would allow Waste Management to pursue concurrent
proceedings with respect to the same set of facts so long as it claimed under different
principles of law, which the majority perceived as a manifest attempt to sidestep
Article 1121. See id. at 236-38.
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with Article 1121Y Such failure to satisfy the Article 1121 condition
precedent to NAFTA arbitration thus warranted a jurisdictional bar
against the tribunal further hearing the merits of Waste
Management's case.2
6
The lack of case precedent other than Waste Management on the
issue of the Article 1121 waiver makes it imperative to further analyze
the waiver provision and highlight the pitfalls of effectuating waivers
submitted under the provision as prerequisites for NAFTA
jurisdiction. This Note presents an in-depth analysis of the provision
against "double-dipping" as it was applied in Waste Management. It
further discusses how the provision should be applied in order to best
preserve what the Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism attempts
to accomplish as a whole-namely, to give investors in Mexico an
"extra measure of comfort" in overseeing their properties and
operations there27 by facilitating access to international arbitration."
Part I presents the historical background which precedes the
execution of NAFTA itself and the birth of Chapter 11 dispute
resolution. Part I then provides an overview of the key provisions
related to dispute resolution under Chapter 11. Part II summarizes
the pertinent portions of the majority's decision in Waste Management
and contrasts it with the opinion rendered by the dissenting arbitrator.
Part III argues that the Article 1121 waiver, as applied in Waste
Management, presents significant opportunity costs for arbitrating
under NAFTA because investors are stripped of their right to pursue
alternative local litigation, even with respect to claims which in
actuality do not amount to NAFTA claims. Specifically, the majority
in Waste Management disregarded the merits of Waste Management's
claim under Chapter 11 for expropriation based on contractual breach
despite the existence of substantial questions of fact. In addition, Part
III proposes a more equitable method of applying the Article 1121
waiver that would minimize such opportunity costs and reconcile the
adverse effects of Waste Management with future cases in which the
Article 1121 issue might arise. Instead of allowing waivers submitted
under Article 1121 to take effect prospectively, the better approach
would be to apply the waivers retrospectively after a factual
determination is made verifying that the claims made in the
arbitration do indeed constitute NAFTA claims. This Note concludes
that in light of the policy objectives of Chapter 11 to assure investors
impartial adjudication of disputes before an international tribunal,
NAFTA arbitrators should reassess the proper application of Article
25. Id. at 238-39.
26. Id. at 239.
27. Gantz, supra note 3, at 347.
28. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642 (stating that one
of the express purposes of Chapter 11 dispute resolution is to assure investors of the
NAFTA Parties "due process before an impartial tribunal").
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1121 and consider using the retrospective approach in order to best
further those objectives.
I. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 11 DISPUTE RESOLUTION
An analysis of the historical differences between the United States
and Mexico regarding the treatment of foreign investment is essential
to appreciate fully the significance of and purposes behind the
creation of the comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism in
Chapter 11 of NAFTA. This part provides an historical overview of
the respective ideological viewpoints taken by the United States and
Mexico on issues regarding foreign investment dispute settlement,
given their offsetting positions as industrialized State versus
developing State. Following the historical discussion, this part
outlines the key provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA, focusing
particular attention on the Article 1121 waiver provision.
A. The Ideological Divide Between the United States and Mexico on
the Treatment of Foreign Investment
1. The United States as Industrialized State and Capital-Exporter:
Diplomatic Protection
At the end of the nineteenth century, developed countries initiated
a movement to establish international standards to protect the
investments of their nationals and firms abroad.' Based on
traditional rules for the protection of property, which in turn had
"developed from the law of [S]tate responsibility of [sic] injury to
aliens and alien property," such standards governed the "extent to
which the host [S]tate [could] interfere with private property."'
Breach of the standards by the host country "'provide[d] a legitimate
basis for the exercise by the home State of the right of diplomatic
protection"' on behalf of its aggrieved citizen .3  The institution of
diplomatic protection refers to the inherent power of a home
government to intercede on behalf of its nationals or firms abroad to
assert claims against the host country for injuries suffered to their
person or properties located in the host country.n More specifically,
29. Sandrino, supra note 8, at 265.
30. Id. at 265-66. Previously, the framework for international investment and
capital flow relied almost exclusively on the various political and economic interests
of developed and developing countries. Id. at 265. The need to establish international
standards surfaced with the clashing interests of developed States, on the one hand, to
provide enhanced protection for investments and property of their nationals abroad
and the resistance of developing States, on the other hand, to any intervention in their
affairs by foreign governments. See id. at 265-68.
31. Id. at 266 (quoting Samuel K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign
Investment A Reappraisal, 37 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 588, 590 (1988)).
32. Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause 5 (1955).
2001] 661
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diplomatic protection provides citizens abroad, whose person or
property has suffered damages, an opportunity to appeal to their own
government if satisfactory relief cannot be obtained through the
remedial processes available in the host State.33
As a major capital-exporter and source of foreign investment,4 the
United States incorporated the policy of diplomatic protection into its
negotiations with countries that would eventually host its investors.
The United States asserted that an international minimum standard of
compensation for injuries to foreign investors should be the
controlling standard and that it had a right to take action on behalf of
its citizens in an international tribunal.35 Not surprisingly, such efforts
to implement diplomatic protection met vigorous resistance from less
developed countries such as Mexico,36 which valued their sovereignty
to freely establish any level of treatment toward foreigners and
foreign investments.37 From the perspective of developing countries,
the institution of diplomatic protection placed an oppressive burden
upon them and subjected them to the abusive tactics of more powerful
States, who wielded their strength over the weaker States to compel
recoveries for incredulous claims without regard to their merits.3
2. Mexico as Developing Country and Capital-Importer:
Sovereignty Under the Calvo Doctrine
In response to the perceived threat to sovereignty that diplomatic
protection posed to developing countries and its potential for abuse
by stronger countries,3 9 Mexico joined many Latin American
developing nations in adopting and incorporating into its law the
"Calvo Doctrine."4 Named after Dr. Carlos Calvo, an Argentine
33. Id.
34. See Daly, supra note 2, at 1151, 1156 (associating NAFTA with the ideals of
fully integrated economies and the free flow of capital and trade between the
signatory States).
35. See id. at 1150-51. Indeed, all United States bilateral investment treaties
contained provisions for binding international arbitration and the incorporation of
international legal standards of compensation for injured investors. See Gantz, supra
note 3, at 338-39.
36. Daly, supra note 2, at 1151.
37. See id. at 1162.
38. See id. at 1161-62. In some instances, the home states of foreign investors even
went so far as to utilize armed intervention under the veil of diplomatic protection to
force recovery from weaker nations on dubious claims made by its citizens. Id. at
1163. Examples of such events include the 1838 and 1861 French interventions in
Mexico, the 1904 United States intervention in Santo Domingo, and the 1902-03
intervention in Venezuela by Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. Id. at 1163 n.83. A
bit of irony lies in the fact that diplomatic protection was initially formed to shield
foreign investors from the abuse and poor administration of local "justice" by citizens
of the host country. See id. at 1163.
39. See supra note 38.
40. See Daly, supra note 2, at 1164-65. One commentator attributes the main
cause of Mexico's restrictive stance on foreign investment to the rapidly growing
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jurist who most articulately fought against the abuse of diplomatic
protection, the doctrine sought to preserve the spirit of sovereignty
among States by setting forth two "cardinal principles": (1)
nonintervention among States and (2) denial of special status and
enhanced treatment of foreigners above nationals." As one writer
described the doctrine:
[S]overeign states, being free and independent, enjoy the right, on
the basis of equality, to freedom from 'interference of any sort' ...
by other states, whether it be by force or diplomacy, and second,
that aliens are not entitled to rights and privileges not accorded to
nationals, and that therefore they may seek redress for grievances
only before the local authorities.4
Mexico became one of the leading supporters of the Calvo
Doctrine, enacting a provision in its constitution that expressly
"exclude[d] diplomatic protection under any circumstance." 3  By
operating under such constitutional principles and reserving to itself
exclusive control over its economic and legal systems, Mexico calmed
its fear of increasing foreign influence in its territory.' Furthermore,
Mexico attempted to inculcate the ideals of the Calvo Doctrine into its
own negotiations with potential investor States, as the United States
tried to do with diplomatic protection,' by drafting agreements
containing clauses that limited the maximum protection foreigners
could seek to that accorded to Mexican nationals.46 Naturally, this led
presence of foreign-owned transnational corporations in Mexico during the late 1960s
and 1970s, combined with negative views that developing countries held toward such
corporations in general. See Sandrino, supra note 8, at 297. The notion that such
corporations operated for Mexico's benefit by providing sources of technology,
employment, and training dissipated by the 1970s and was replaced by the perception
that the entities were "foreign intruders that sought personal profits without
considering the social and economic needs of the host [S]tate." Id.
41. Shea, supra note 32, at 19-20.
42. Id at 19.
43. Daly, supra note 2, at 1164-65. The provision, which addresses the right of
foreigners to acquire lands and waters in Mexico, states: "The State may grant the
same right to foreigners, provided they agree ... to consider themselves as nationals
in respect to such property, and bind themselves not to invoke the protection of their
Governments in matters relating thereto...." Id. at 1165 n.94 (quoting Mex. Const.
art. 27). Interestingly, this provision has not been held to vitiate in any way the
Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism contained in the NAFTA, which would
come about later and also take effect as the supreme law of Mexico upon Senate
ratification of the treaty. See id. at 1160, 1188-89. The Mexican government made
certain to eliminate any possibility for constitutional attacks against the NAFTA
under its Law Regarding the Making of Treaties, which expressly acknowledges
negotiations on dispute settlement provisions in international treaties and orders the
enforcement and recognition of arbitral awards rendered under those treaties. Id. at
1188-89.
44. See Sandrino, supra note 8, at 284.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
46. See Daly, supra note 2, at 1166-67. As a result of the Calvo Doctrine,
numerous contracts between Latin American countries in general and other States
emerged containing clauses that "barred international arbitration as a means of
2001] 2663
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to a long period of division between the United States and Mexico
with regard to issues concerning the treatment of foreign investment
and the settlement of investment disputes,47 which set the stage for a
monumental breakthrough with the signing of NAFTA and adoption
of Chapter 11.
3. Bridging the Historical Gap: Birth of NAFTA and Chapter 11
Dispute Resolution
Due in large part to Mexico's rising need for foreign capital48 and
substantial changes in the legal and economic climates of Calvo
Doctrine countries in general,4 9 the once seemingly impenetrable wall
of sovereignty separating Mexico and the United States finally
cracked in 1993 upon the adoption of NAFTA. In particular, a new
framework for dispute resolution under Chapter 11 was created in
keeping with the general purposes of NAFTA to "increase
substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties"
and "create effective procedures... for the resolution of disputes."50
The provisions of the framework effectively guaranteed individual
investors of NAFTA Parties equal treatment "in accordance with the
principle of international reciprocity and due process before an
impartial tribunal,' thus laying to rest those issues which had so
sharply divided the United States and Mexico in the past.52
From the standpoint of the United States, the risks and
uncertainties that its investors faced in submitting claims in the local
forums, which had previously warranted its strong adherence to the
diplomatic protection regime, were no longer prevalent under the
Chapter 11 framework. 3 By allowing individual investors to directly
invoke an international means of dispute resolution,54 Chapter 11
eliminated the need for potential investors to contemplate
settling disputes." Lisa C. Thompson, International Dispute Resolution in the United
States and Mexico: A Practical Guide to Terms, Arbitration Clauses, and the
Enforcement of Judgments and Arbitral Awards, 24 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 1, 27
(1997).
47. See Price, supra note 6, at 736.
48. See Daly, supra note 2, at 1160, 1177 ("When economic realities outweigh the
benefits of embracing a doctrinal stance, the true position of a [S]tate crystallizes.").
49. In addition to the need for the continued inflow of foreign investment, the
birth of the NAFTA was facilitated by the transformation of many former Calvo
Doctrine countries into "market economies with stable judiciaries, [where] the fear of
abuse by more powerful states is no longer so prevalent." Id. at 1187.
50. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 1, art. 102,32 I.L.M. at 297.
51. Id. ch. 11, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
52. See supra Parts I.A.1. and I.A.2.
53. See Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Main, NAFTA Chapter 11:
Investment and Investment Disputes, NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rev. Am., Summer 1996, at
82, 115 (praising the framework provided in Chapter 11 by which investors could
bypass the local courts and administrative systems and directly seek international
arbitration against host countries as "enormously positive news").
54. Id.
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undertaking the uncertain, confusing, and daunting task of dispute
resolution in unfamiliar territory" grounded in a different system of
jurisprudence. 6 Chapter 11 also quelled the United States' fear that
its citizens would be subject to national bias and partiality by the local
judicial authority hearing their cases, resulting in unfair and
inappropriate resolutions.57  Furthermore, Chapter 11 liberated
investors from various other risks attendant to local adjudication of
disputes, such as unpredictable methods of enforcement, different
standards of confidentiality regarding matters in dispute, and
significant expenses and time related to local court proceedings.' In
sum, the Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism established
"predictability and certainty" for United States investors conducting
business in Mexico 59 by virtually neutralizing the requirement of local
proceedings central to the Calvo Doctrine,6 thereby minimizing the
55. See Camp, Dispute Resolution, supra note 3, at 100 (describing the onerous
task of investors having to deal with two different systems of civil justice in the United
States and Mexico). In fact, litigating in Mexico, even from the perspective of its own
citizens, is seen as a last resort only after all other means of negotiating a resolution
over a dispute have failed. See id. A common saying in Mexico is: "A bad settlement
is better than a good lawsuit." Id. (internal quotes omitted).
56. See id. at 89. For example, Mexico imposes a limitation on the amount of
damages recoverable in "a civil action, whereas [United States] law creates
opportunities for unlimited damages, including punitive damages." Id. Furthermore,
"[tihe jury is not a part of adjudication of civil disputes in Mexico, whereas it is an
integral part of the system in the United States." ld. Instead, Mexican trials primarily
consist of panels of judges who sift through documentary evidence and ask witnesses
questions. Id Mexico also places less emphasis on pre-trial discovery than does the
United States. Id. On a more general level, Mexican jurisprudence relies mostly on a
civil code system, whereas the United States places substantial weight on traditional
common law standards. Jimmie V. Reyna et al., Practice Before U.S.-Mexico
Binational Panels Under Chapter Nineteen of NAFTA: A Panel Discussion, 5 U.S.-
Mex. L.J. 73, 73 (1997).
57. See Thompson, supra note 46, at 2 (noting the reluctance of international
disputants to submit their claims before local courts for fear of "some type of 'home
court' advantage" in favor of the local party, in addition to the already arduous
challenge of arguing under local law and before a court that might lack expertise in
international matters); cf Hans Dolinar, New Perspectives of International
Commercial Arbitration in Europe, 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 519, 529 (1994) (discussing
the initial fear of Eastern European countries of bias lurking in Western arbitral
institutions, the diffusion of "which [later] led to a stronger acceptance in the East of
Western arbitral institutions").
58. Camp, Dispute Resolution, supra note 3, at 90.
59. Daly, supra note 2, at 1160.
60. Some experts have even said that the new investment provisions amounted to
"a repudiation of the Calvo Doctrine." Id. at 1180 (quoting Gary C. Hufbauer &
Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment 82 (1993)). Moreover, investors in Mexico
may breathe an added sigh of relief with the knowledge that the Mexican Constitution
expressly mandates that international treaties such as the NAFTA supersede both
federal and state law. See Margarita Treviflo Balli & David S. Coale, Recent Reforms
to Mexican Arbitration Law: Is Constitutionality Achievable?, 30 Tex. Int'l l.J. 535,
551 (1995) (summarizing article 133 of the Mexican Constitution).
Mexico's apparent willingness to adopt the provisions of Chapter 11, which
effectively nullify the Calvo Doctrine, has spurred a change in attitude about foreign
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need for the United States to rely on traditional notions of diplomatic
protection.61
From Mexico's standpoint, the promulgation of Chapter 11
provided a ready safeguard against the potential for industrialized
States to institute diplomatic protection on behalf of their investors,
which Mexico considered an attack on its sovereignty.' Under the
new dispute resolution framework, investors themselves had full
standing to resolve disputes with the host country immediately in an
international forum without having to appeal to their home
governments to do so on their behalf. 63 By granting private investors
the right to claim directly against any breaching NAFTA Party in an
international forum,6' Chapter 11 essentially rendered obsolete the
principal function of diplomatic protection, which was to afford
remedies to wronged investors who lacked the power to claim directly
against the host country.65 Therefore, Mexico no longer had any cause
investment on the part of the Third World in general because Mexico is the most
recognized champion of the Third World's position against traditional principles of
State responsibility for injuries to aliens and their investments. See Sandrino, supra
note 8, at 323.
61. See supra Part I.A.1; see also Daly, supra note 2, at 1192 (doubting that United
States investors would continue resorting to diplomatic protection ideals, given the
methods of recourse available under the NAFTA enabling them to claim directly
against host States for wrongful acts and measures).
62. See supra Part I.A.2.
63. See Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM)
and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 113, 115-
16 (1999) (identifying the principle that only the State has standing to bring claims in
an international forum as one of the key components underlying diplomatic
protection).
64. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, arts. 1116, 1117, 32 I.L.M. at 642-43;
Macdonald, supra note 3, at 281. The NAFTA's predecessor, the United States-
Canada Free Trade Agreement, did not provide for international arbitration of
investment disputes between private parties and governments even though it
resembled the NAFTA in many other respects, particularly concerning "national
treatment, performance requirements, transfers of funds and expropriation." Gantz,
supra note 3, at 340. It is also worth noting that under Chapter 11, investors may only
bring claims against the host country itself and not against any political subdivisions of
the State, even if such subdivisions have actually committed the transgression and are
bound under the NAFTA in the same manner as the State. See Adam Sulkowski,
NAFTA's Indirect Expropriation Protections: Will Compensation Be Required When
Ecological Protections Are Applied?, Mealey's Int'l Arb. Rep., Feb. 2000, at 23, 31
n.25.
65. See Part I.A.1. Interestingly, an unofficial form of diplomatic protection
nevertheless does seem to exist in the NAFTA. See Daly, supra note 2, at 1186. In the
event a Party fails to comply with an award rendered in connection with a claim made
by an investor, the investor can appeal to his or her home government to assert a
claim alleging that a Party breached a general obligation of the NAFTA. Id. Since
this method of recourse essentially duplicates the effect of diplomatic protection,
Mexico has even less reason to fear that United States investors will resort to the
traditional form of diplomatic protection instead of claiming damages under the
Chapter 11 mechanism. See id. at 1192.
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to rely on the Calvo Doctrine as an internal barrier against the
institution of diplomatic protection.66
B. Key Provisions of Chapter 11
1. General Provisions
The revolutionary framework for dispute resolution set forth in
Chapter 11 represents a general intent on the part of NAFTA Parties
to "increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of
the Parties" and "create effective procedures.., for the resolution of
disputes." 67 The particular purpose behind Chapter 11 is to establish
"a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes that assures
both equal treatment among investors of the Parties in accordance
with the principle of international reciprocity and due process before
an impartial tribunal."'  In essence, Chapter 11 guarantees foreign
investors the right, previously nonexistent in Calvo Doctrine
jurisdictions like Mexico,69 to bypass the risk and uncertainty
66. See supra Part I.A.2.
One skeptic rejects the notion that Chapter 1l's assurances of international
reciprocity and equal treatment really confer any benefit to Mexico at all since it is
not a capital exporter like the United States, but is rather an important recipient of
foreign capital. See Bernardo Septilveda Amor, International Law and National
Sovereignty: The NAFTA and the Claims of Merican Jurisdiction, 19 Hous. J. Int'l L
565, 574 (1997). Claiming that such provisions under Chapter 11 amount to little
more than a "straight jacket on national jurisdiction," Amor criticizes the scheme as
granting foreign investors privileged status over nationals, and thereby encouraging
their lack of respect for Mexican jurisprudence. See id. at 588. He comments that a
mere grant of guarantees would have little impact on attracting foreign capital into a
country and, instead, lists his own factors for what would have an impact, none of
which are related to dispute resolution: "1) political stability; 2) the existence of a rule
of law, 3) favorable economic conditions of the host country: 4) a positive fiscal
regime; 5) employment regulations; 6) communication and transportation
infrastructure; 7) high profitability from investments, 8) free transfer of financial
flows; and 9) a favorable 'climate of investment."' Id. at 589. Amor predicts that
foreign investment would flow into Mexico so long as these factors are met. See id.
Another critic of the Chapter 11 dispute resolution mechanism takes a different
approach. See Ganguly, supra note 63, at 114. Also based principally on ideals of
national sovereignty, Ganguly suggests that investor-State dispute mechanisms such
as the one in Chapter 11 can prevent host country legislatures from enacting laws in
the interest of the national public. See id. at 119. By allowing outsiders to bypass
completely the local legal systems and bring actions directly against host governments
for measures in violation of the NAFTA, the dispute resolution mechanism indirectly
gives investors the power to question national legislation without any form of checks
and balances. See id. at 114, 120. Therefore, due to the threat of potential liability and
unmanageable caseloads, host country governments would avoid legislating
exclusively in the interest of the public for fear of inadvertently causing harm to
outsiders. See id. at 119.
67. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 1, art. 102, 32 I.L.M. at 297.
68. Id. ch. 11, art. 1115,32 I.L.M. at 642.
69. See supra Part I.A.2.
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attendant to submitting claims in the local courts or administrative
systems and directly invoke an international arbitration mechanism. 0
Articles 111671 and 111772 constitute the core of the framework for
dispute resolution under Chapter 11. They collectively enable an
investor on behalf of himself or herself, or on behalf of an enterprise
that the investor controls or owns, to institute arbitration proceedings
for damages resulting from a breach by a Party of the NAFTA
provisions.73 The aggrieved investor may submit his or her claims to
arbitration under the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention,74 the Additional Facility
Rules of the ICSID, 5 or the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 76 To
encourage disputing parties to cooperate in tailoring an informal
settlement prior to seeking arbitration,7 7 Chapter 11 requires the
disputants to attempt "to settle a claim through consultation or
negotiation. 78 It also requires the claimant to deliver to the opposing
party a notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration at least ninety
70. Levin & Marin, supra note 53, at 115.
71. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1116, 32 I.L.M. at 642-43.
72. Id. ch. 11, art. 1117, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
73. See id. ch. 11, arts. 1116, 1117, 32 I.L.M. at 64243. The limitation period
during which an investor may bring a claim under Chapter 11 is capped at three years
"from the date on which the investor [or the enterprise] first acquired, or should have
first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor [or
the enterprise] has incurred loss or damage." Id.
74. In 1965 the United States and other nations drafted the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States in a
continuing effort to improve standards for the treatment of foreign investment among
member countries. Gantz, supra note 3, at 339. ICSID, an institution affiliated with
the World Bank and located in Washington D.C., was organized under the
Convention to serve primarily as secretariat for arbitration proceedings brought
under the terms and conditions of the Convention. Id. at 339-40.
75. The Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, in essence, make it possible for even
non-member states to the ICSID Convention to submit arbitration claims under the
Convention as long as one of the parties (i.e., either the host country or the investor's
country) to the dispute is a party to the Convention. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11,
art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. at 643; Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (Additional Facility Rules), art. 2, at
http://www.worldbank.orgicsid/facility/3.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). Because
neither Canada nor Mexico is a contracting state to the ICSID Convention, disputes
involving either one of the two Parties and a United States-based investor would have
to be raised under the Additional Facility Rules or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
See, e.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 15 ICSID Rev.:
Foreign Investment L.J. 214 (2000), available at http://www.worldbank.orglicsid/
cases/awards.htm (involving a dispute raised between a United States-based investor
and Mexico under the Additional Facility Rules); NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral
Tribunal. Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada (Award on Jurisdiction), 38
I.L.M. 708 (UNCITRAL 1999) (adjudicating a dispute between a United States-based
investor and Canada under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules).
76. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1120, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
77. Gantz, supra note 3, at 343.
78. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1118,32 I.L.M. at 643.
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days before the claim is actually submitted." With respect to the body
of law governing NAFTA arbitration, Article 1131 provides that
tribunals established under Chapter 11 'shall decide the issues in
dispute in accordance with [NAFTA] and applicable rules of
international law. "80
2. Article 1121 Waiver Provision
Supplementary to the core framework described above are two
conditions precedent to the submission of claims to arbitration under
Chapter 11, listed in Article 1121: 1) written consent of the investor
(and its enterprise, if applicable) to arbitration in accordance with the
provisions of NAFTA8' and 2) delivery by the investor (and its
enterprise, if applicable) to the opposing Party of a written waiver of
its "right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or
court under the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement
procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the
disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach" of NAFTA."2 The
second condition precedent, plainly stated, prevents claimants from
"double-dipping" in multiple legal forums with respect to the same
measures alleged to have caused them injury. The NAFTA Parties
drafted the waiver provision in order to protect against the possibility
of aggrieved investors pursuing parallel proceedings on both the
national level and at the international level under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA,s3 which could yield a host of unwelcome results. Some of
79. Id. ch. 11, art. 1119, 32 I.L.M. at 643.
80. Id. ch. 11, art. 1131, 32 I.L.M. at 645.
81. This requirement of consent substitutes for the consent normally required
from disputants by ICSID as a prerequisite for its jurisdiction to hear claims under the
Convention. See Gantz, supra note 3, at 344. Making consent a prerequisite for
NAFTA arbitration indicates the intent of the NAFTA Parties to recognize the
importance of "the autonomy of the will of the [disputing] parties" as the true
controlling basis for a NAFTA arbitral tribunal's power to hear the matters in
dispute. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 15 ICSID
Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. 214. 227-28 (2000). available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm ("[lit is upon that very consent to
arbitration given by the parties that the entire effectiveness of this institution
depends.").
82. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1121, 32 I.L.M. at 643. An exception to the
waiver condition precedent is made for "proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or
other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages." Id. Since NAFTA
arbitral tribunals only have the power to issue awards for "monetary damages and any
applicable interest," "restitution of property," and "costs" related to arbitration,
pursuant to Article 1135 governing final awards, investors need not waive their rights
to seek these other forms of relief in domestic courts. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch.
11, art. 1135, 32 I.L.M. at 646.
83. See Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment LiJ. at 235-36
(describing the "imminent risk" that the NAFTA claimant would obtain double
benefits if a provision such as Article 1121 were not present to preclude the claimant
from pursuing concurrent proceedings with respect to legal issues derived from the
same measures of transgression). In Mexico's case. an added protection was built into
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those results would include claimants enjoying twice the benefits on
their claim for damages," risk of conflicting outcomes on the same
issue, and forum-shopping between the local and international levelsY
Overall, the Chapter 11 provisions offer more comfort and promote
a friendlier environment for NAFTA investors seeking to establish a
local presence in Canada, the United States, or Mexico. Particularly
with respect to the United States and Mexico, the Chapter 11
framework embodies an ideal compromise between two countries
which for so long had maintained their allegiance to widely divergent
principles of international investment in diplomatic protection86 and
the Calvo Doctrine.' One of the unfortunate realities that emanates
from the introduction of such an unprecedented, innovative
framework, however, is the emergence of new procedural issues,
which have the potential for generating controversy and litigation
without the added benefit of guiding precedent. Satisfaction of the
Article 1121 waiver condition precedent, described above,88 is one
such issue which, as the next part describes, has resulted in litigation
leading to a questionable outcome.
NAFTA under Annex 1120.1, which expressly forbids the continuation of local
proceedings in Mexico concurrently with NAFTA arbitration regarding allegations
that Mexico has breached an obligation under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA. See
NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, annex 1120.1, 32 I.L.M. at 648. Mexico provided
double protection for itself in this manner because it was doubly exposed to the risk
of simultaneous proceedings in that claimants could bring complaints based on
NAFTA provisions in Mexican courts under Mexico's current constitutional
framework. See Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 268 (Highet,
Arb.. dissenting). The relevant portion of Annex 1120.1(a) states: "[Ain investor of
another Party may not allege that Mexico has breached an obligation under [Chapter
Eleven, Section A] ... both in an arbitration under this Section and in proceedings
before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal." NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11,
annex 1120.1, 32 I.L.M. at 648. Similar to the way in which Article 1121 prevents
"double-dipping," Annex 1120.1 restricts NAFTA investors in Mexico from taking
"two bites of the same apple." See Levin & Main, supra note 53, at 110. Annex
1120.1 only precludes local claims to the extent that they address in some form the
issue of the Mexican government having breached provisions of Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA. Id. at 111. For instance, Annex 1120.1 would not preclude access to Chapter
11 arbitration on a claim for wrongful expropriation pursuant to Article 1110 unless
an allegation of expropriation had also been made in the Mexican courts. See id.
84. Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 235-36.
85. Id. at 259-60 (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Although in theory such a threat
could arise, forum-shopping in practice does not seem likely to present too great a
risk since the costs and inconvenience inherent in using the local forum as an
alternative to the international forum would probably outweigh the benefits. See
supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
86. See supra Part I.A.1.
87. See supra Part I.A.2.
88. See supra Part I.B.2.
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II. CASE STUDY: ARTICLE 1121 WAIVER AS APPLIED IN WASTE
MANAGEMENT, INC. V. UNITED MEXICAN STATES
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States" provides an ideal
starting point for analyzing issues related to the Article 1121 waiver,
because it exemplifies from a practical perspective the manner in
which an arbitral tribunal invoked under NAFTA would likely review
a waiver submitted by a NAFTA claimant.' This part summarizes the
factual events giving rise to the Article 1121 waiver issues discussed in
Waste Management91 and compares the respective positions of the
majority and dissent in determining the validity of a waiver submitted
pursuant to the provision.92
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On September 29, 1998, Waste Management, Inc., acting on its own
behalf and on behalf of its investment, Acaverde S.A. de C.V., filed a
notice of arbitration proceedings against the Government of the
United Mexican States in accordance with the Additional Facility
Rules of ICSID.93 Waste Management claimed compensation for
damages arising from breaches of Article 1105, which mandates fair
and equitable treatment of the investments of foreign investors," and
Article 1110, which provides against inappropriate expropriations,'
by State-owned entities-Banco Nacional De Obras Y Servicios
Ptiblicos, S.N.C. ("Banobras"), the Mexican State of Guerrero
("Guerrero"), and the City Council of Acapulco De Judrez
("Acapulco").96 Certain events led to the claims made by Waste
Management, including an alleged refusal by Acapulco to pay invoices
89. 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 214.
90. id
91. See infra Part II.A.
92. See infra Part II.B and Part II.C.
93. Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment LJ. at 216. For an
explanation of the Additional Facility Rules, see supra note 75.
94. The full provision sets up the minimum standard of treatment each Party must
provide: "Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security." NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1105, 32 I.LM. at
639. This standard of treatment governs regardless of whether citizens of the host
Party are extended the same treatment by that Party's government. Levin & Main,
supra note 53, at 85.
95. The provision states the general rule that -[n]o Party may directly or indirectly
nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an
investment." NAF'A, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1110. 32 I.L.1A. at 641. Exceptions to
the general rule consist of expropriations done 1) for a public purpose; 2) on a non-
discriminatory basis; 3) in accordance with due process of law and the provisions in
Article 1105 for fair and equitable treatment; and 4) on payment of appropriate
compensation. Id For further discussion on expropriation claims in general, see infra
notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
96. Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment LJ. at 216-17.
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submitted by Acaverde under a concession agreement' and
Banobras' failure to make payments for the defaulting Acapulco as
guarantor under a line of credit agreement.98
To ensure that it properly complied with the waiver condition of
Article 1121, Waste Management entered into a series of
correspondence with ICSID concerning the contents of its written
waiver, the final confirmed version of which states in pertinent part:
Claimants hereby waive their right to initiate or continue before any
administrative tribunal or court under the law of any NAFTA Party,
or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect
to the measures taken by Respondent that are alleged to be in breach
of NAFTA Chapter Eleven and applicable rules of international
law .... Without derogating from the waiver required by NAFTA
Article 1121, Claimants here set forth their understanding that the
above waiver does not apply to any dispute settlement proceedings
involving allegations that Respondent has violated duties imposed
by sources of law other than Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, including
the municipal law of Mexico.99
Mexico protested in defense that the ICSID arbitral panel lacked
jurisdiction to hear Waste Management's case because the waiver
submitted by Waste Management failed to conform both in form and
content to the terms meted out in Article 1121.00
As evidence of Waste Management's noncompliance with the
waiver provision, Mexico pointed to the fact that legal proceedings
initiated by Acaverde in internal forums-two suits against Banobras
and one proceeding against Acapulco 01-were still pending as of the
date the present NAFTA claims were filed."m Mexico asserted that
Waste Management's local claims for breach of contract and
nonpayment of invoices against the Mexican entities overlapped with
its claims submitted in the NAFTA arbitration. 13 Conversely, Waste
97. See supra note 18 for an explanation of "concession contract."
98. Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 222. See supra note
19 for a definition of "line of credit" agreement.
99. Id. at 220-21. (quoting letter of Sept. 29, 1999 from Waste Management to
ICSID Secretary-General) (bold added in original)).
100. Id. at 222.
101. The first proceeding filed against Banobras was a mercantile action for
Banobras's failure to fulfill its obligations as guarantor of Acapulco pursuant to a
credit line agreement to make payments on behalf of Acapulco. Id. at 232-33. The
second action against Banobras was for failure to pay certain invoices under the credit
line agreement. Id. at 233. In its action against Acapulco, Acaverde claimed damages
for nonpayment of services and breach of a series of obligations under a concession
agreement. Id. None of the three proceedings ultimately resulted in a recovery for
Acaverde. Id. at 232-33.
102. Id. at 222.
103. Id. Considering its disapproval of the apparent overlap in claims made by
Waste Management in the Mexican forums and before the present NAFTA tribunal,
Mexico's failure to assert its own automatic bar against parallel proceedings in Annex
1120.1, see supra note 83, seems puzzling. See id. at 269 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
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Management contended that no such overlap in claims existed
because it did not allege a NAFTA-related breach, Mexico was not a
named party in such internal proceedings and, therefore, Waste
Management had preserved the sanctity of its waiver." Waste
Management insisted that its claims at the local level for breach of
contract and nonpayment of invoices against Banobras and Acapulco
differed in substance from those made under NAFTA for
expropriation and unfair and inequitable treatment." The former
were local commercial causes of action, which strictly arose under
local law, whereas the latter pertained to international obligations on
Mexico imposed by the specific provisions (i.e., Article 1110 and
Article 1105) of NAFTA. °6
B. The Majority Opinion
The Waste Management tribunal prefaced its analysis by noting that,
in general, questions concerning the fulfillment of conditions
precedent to arbitration under NAFTA deserve the most rigid
scrutiny since their fulfillment literally opens the door to NAFTA
arbitration."w With regard to the case at hand, the tribunal embarked
on a detailed examination of the scope and content of a waiver
required under the Article 1121 condition precedent to arbitration."'
The tribunal deemed it crucial to define the type of conduct
prohibited by a valid waiver submitted under Article 1121 .' In so
doing, the tribunal needed only to reiterate the express language of
Article 1121, which proscribes the "initiation or continuation of
proceedings under the law of either [State of the disputants] with
Perhaps Mexico doubted the applicability of Annex 1120.1 for some reason and
wished to defer the questions regarding the alleged duplicate proceedings of Waste
Management to the arbitral tribunal for an adjudication based on jurisdictional
grounds under Article 1121. See id. (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
104. Id. at 222-23. Waste Management, in fact, expressed its intent directly to the
Mexican government not to withdraw any of its ongoing proceedings in the domestic
forums in a letter, dated as late as Feb. 10, 1999: "Regarding your request about the
ongoing arbitration proceeding in Mexico, we do not believe that our client is
required to suspend any proceedings in Mexico that it is otherwise entitled to
institute .... Id at 236.
105. See id. at 222-23.
106. See id. at 234.
107. See id. at 228. The tribunal stated:
[I]t is the understanding of this Tribunal that any analysis of the fulfilment of
the prerequisites established as conditions precedent to submission of a
claim to arbitration under NAFTA Article 1121 calls for the utmost
attention, since fulfilment thereof opens the way, ipso facto, to an arbitration
procedure in accordance with the commitment acquired by the parties as
signatories to said international treaty.
Id.
108. See id. at 228-39.
109. See id at 233-38.
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respect to a measure allegedly breaching the provisions" of Chapter
11 of NAFTA." °
With respect to the Waste Management case then, the majority
tribunal focused on whether the waiver submitted by Waste
Management permitted the conduct expressly prohibited by Article
1121 of maintaining concurrent proceedings, in which case the waiver
would be invalid.' Although the waiver in large part indicated Waste
Management's intent to abdicate its rights to pursue local proceedings
with respect to the same measures alleged to be breaches of
NAFTA,12 the tribunal pointed to particular language that was
suspect:
Without derogating from the waiver required by NAFTA Article
1121, Claimants here set forth their understanding that the above
waiver does not apply to any dispute settlement proceedings involving
allegations that Respondent has violated duties imposed by sources of
law other than Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, including the municipal
law of Mexico." 3
Such an interpretation of the waiver requirement, if enforced,
would enable Waste Management to pursue local litigation freely
alongside NAFTA litigation as long as it never expressly claimed
violations of Chapter 11 of NAFTA in the local proceedings.1 1 4 Based
on this understanding, Waste Management's claims for breach of
contract and nonpayment of invoices against Banobras and Acapulco
pending in the local forums would conform to Article 1121 since, as
Waste Management contended, they were not derived from express
provisions of NAFTA like expropriation and unfair and inequitable
treatment.!l5
In the majority's view, the threshold inquiry was not whether the
claims made by Waste Management in the local forums differed from
its claims in the present arbitration, but whether they arose from the
same measures alleged to be breaches of NAFTA."6 According to the
110. See id. at 237.
111. See id. at 234-36.
112. See id. at 232.
113. Id. at 234.
114. See id. The tribunal stated:
Following this line of reasoning, the Claimant would have acted in
accordance with the terms of its waiver since, in fact, [it] did not expressly
invoke those provisions of NAFTA that it considered breached before other
courts or tribunals, but instead ... under Mexican legislation, instituted
several claims for monetary compensation in respect of unpaid invoices and
non-compliance with various obligations under a line of credit agreement
and a Concession Agreement, considering such conduct "permissible" in
light of its own interpretation of said waiver. This justification of its conduct
is unsustainable ....
Id.
115. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
116. See Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 235.
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tribunal, the dual claims merely represented different ways of stating
the same cause of action." 7 In the words of the tribunal:
It is clear that one and the same measure may give rise to different
types of claims in different courts or tribunals. Therefore,
something that under Mexican legislation would constitute a series
of breaches of contract expressed as non-payment of certain
invoices, violation of exclusivity clauses in a concession agreement,
etc., could, under the NAFTA, be interpreted as a lack of fair and
equitable treatment of a foreign investment by a government
(Article 1105 of NAFTA) or as measures constituting
"expropriation" under Article 1110 of the NAFTA."8
In making its determination that the local actions of Waste
Management looked to the same measures as those alleged in the
present proceedings to be breaches of NAFTA, the majority saw no
need to delve into the substantive similarities or dissimilarities of the
dual claims.119 Such substantive questions belonged more properly to
an analysis of the merits of each claim, which was not imperative for
purposes of considering the application of the Article 1121 waiver
because it constituted only a condition precedent to arbitration!'2
The presence of the term "alleged" in Article 1121 indicated to the
tribunal that "the elements of comparison to be used at the time of
verifying compliance with the waiver are the presumed or supposed
[as opposed to actual] violations of the NAFTA invoked by the
Claimant and the actions effectively in progress before other courts or
tribunals at that time. 12 1 Therefore, the arbitral majority concluded
that Waste Management's continued pursuit of its local claims for
breach of contract and nonpayment constituted conduct forbidden
under Article 1121 since they arose from the same measures alleged to
be breaches of NAFTA (i.e., expropriation and unfair and inequitable
treatment), 2 2 Moreover, since Waste Management's waiver by its
language would have approved of such conduct outside the breadth of
Article 1121, the majority held that the waiver was invalid and, thus,
that Waste Management was barred from arbitration altogether.,
The majority tribunal also reached its conclusion to bar Waste
Management from Chapter 11 arbitration based on policy grounds
underlying the Article 1121 provision against "double-dipping." 4 It
reasoned that allowing Waste Management to proceed based on its
waiver terms with coexisting claims in both the local forums and the
NAFTA arbitration presented a threat of duplication of
117. See id.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See id.
120. See id-
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. See id. at 237.
123. See id. at 238-39.
124. See id. at 235-36.
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proceedings."z The continuation of legal actions derived from the
same measures, stated the majority, created "the imminent risk that
the Claimant may obtain the double benefit in its claim for
damages.1' 26 The tribunal continued by noting that "[t]his is precisely
what NAFTA Article 1121 seeks to avoid."127 Thus, even from a
public policy perspective Waste Management violated the spirit of the
Article 1121 waiver condition by maintaining its claims against
Banobras and Acapulco at the local level concurrently with its claims
against Mexico in Chapter 11 arbitration.128
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Following the decision of the majority arbitral panel to dismiss
Waste Management's claims under NAFTA for lack of jurisdiction, 1 2
Keith Highet, one of the arbitrators, 10 issued a vigorous dissenting
statement.3 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, Highet argued
that the additional language contained in Waste Management's waiver
did not substantively negate or alter the requirements of Article 1121
to abstain from duplication of proceedings with respect to the same
measures of wrongdoing.'32 The understanding expressed by Waste
Management that its waiver did not "apply to any dispute settlement
125. See id. at 237.
126. Id. at 236.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 239-40.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 240.
131. Id. at 241 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
132. See id. at 243 (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Incidentally, Highet also critiqued
the manner in which the majority reached its conclusion that Waste Management's
claims in the NAFTA arbitration should be barred under Article 1121 because they
arose from the same "measures" as the claims pending in the local forums. See id. at
245-47 (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Highet voiced concern over the majority's failure
to first address the implicit question of what the term "measures" within the meaning
of Article 1121 exactly entails and cited for guidance Article 201 of the NAFTA,
which states: "measure includes any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or
practice." Id. at 245-46 (Highet, Arb., dissenting) (quoting NAFTA, supra note 1, ch.
2, art. 201, 32 I.L.M. at 298). Highet argued that the word "measure," as intended by
the NAFTA Parties in Article 1121, manifested "a particular and limited kind of
action or concept"-in essence, "a State act that is itself a breach of [the State's]
obligations under NAFTA." Id. at 246 (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Actions such as
denial of payment under a letter of credit or cancellation of a concession contract
were not the type of "measures" referred to in Article 1121, but mere local
components of a "measure." Id. (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Such components could
only rise to the level of "measures" if combined with some additional acts committed
by Mexico such as refusals to permit access to judicial review, other forms of denial of
justice at international law or a governmental conspiracy to appropriate Waste
Management's concession. Id. at 246-47 (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Highet concluded,
therefore, that such acts of breach of contract and nonpayment on invoices as alleged
by Waste Management against Banobras and Acapulco could not have been covered
by the term "measures" within the meaning intended in Article 1121 and as used by
the majority. See id. at 246 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
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proceedings involving allegations that Respondent has violated ditties
imposed by sources of law other than Chapter Eleven of NAFTA"'33
only reconfirmed the proper scope of Article 1121,1-' which covered
only those claims "imposed by other sources of law, that are not
different in substance from the obligations of a NAFTA State Party
under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA. 135 In drafting the provision, the
Parties of NAFTA must have intended to draw a basic distinction
"between the legal obligations of Mexico under Mexican law and the
legal obligations of Mexico under its international treaty obligations
imposed by NAFTA."I Highet asserted that if such substantive
distinctions were not made between NAFTA claims and non-NAFTA
claims, it would necessarily follow that NAFTA arbitration would
offer remedies even for issues of national law such as breach of
contract, nonpayment of money, breach of warranty, labor and fair
bargaining, sexual harassment and so forth.'- Highet stated, "It is
inconceivable that any of these complaints had been intended, by the
NAFTA State Party, to be resolved in NAFTA arbitrations. ' '"~s
Therefore, Waste Management's waiver was consistent in substance
with the requirements of Article 1121.119
Furthermore, Highet determined that Waste Management did not
engage in conduct forbidden by Article 1121 in maintaining
concurrent proceedings at the local level and under NAFTA because
it merely did so based on the terms of its tendered waiver."' He
reasoned that Waste Management's local claims against Banobras and
Acapulco for breach of contract and nonpayment of invoices differed
in substance from its claims brought under NAFTA for expropriation
and unfair and inequitable treatment.1 41 The former consisted of local
commercial claims rightfully confined to the Mexican tribunals,
whereas the latter consisted of claims based on specific provisions
governing the international obligations of Mexico under Chapter 11 of
NAFTA.142  Highet reasoned that in order for a duplication of
proceedings to have occurred, Waste Management must have
"essentially alleged the equivalent of a violation of Chapter Eleven" by
alleging nationalization, expropriation, discriminatory conduct or
some other complaint actionable under NAFTA.143 Therefore, Highet
133. Id. at 221.
134. See id at 244 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
135. Id (Highet, Arb., dissenting) (citation omitted).
136. Id (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
137. Id (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
138. Id (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
139. See id at 243-44 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
140. See id at 253 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
141. See id (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
142. Id. (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
143. See id at 261 (Highet, Arb., dissenting). Moreover, Highet provided
additional evidence of the substantive differences between Waste Management's local
claims and its NAFTA claims. He reported that the amount in damages claimed by
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charged the majority with reaching an errant conclusion that Waste
Management should be barred from NAFTA arbitration due to its
tender of a defective waiver which condoned conduct beyond the
intended scope of Article 1121.14
In sum, the disparate views expressed by the majority and dissent in
Waste Management collectively offer a useful illustration of the
intricate issues involved in the practical application of the Article 1121
waiver provision. Rather than representing a dispositive statement of
law, the case demonstrates that such issues related to the waiver
provision will likely form the basis for an abundance of legal
controversy and debate. Given the integral nature of Article 1121 as a
condition precedent to Chapter 11 arbitration, 45 it is critical to
conduct a thorough analysis of the views advanced in Waste
Management in connection with Article 1121 and flesh out their
strengths and weaknesses in light of the policies surrounding NAFTA
as a whole. 46 The next part engages in such an analysis and indeed
reveals the existence of significant flaws in Waste Management that
would lead to the wrong approach of applying the Article 1121 waiver,
thereby causing significant harm to the unwary claimant.
III. A RETROSPECTIVE APPROACH TO APPLYING THE ARTICLE 1121
WAIVER
As demonstrated by the outcome in Waste Management, failure to
submit a valid waiver conforming to the scope of Article 1121 may
lead to such drastic consequences as a complete bar to Chapter 11
arbitration. 147 However, tendering a waiver in total compliance with
the requirements of Article 1121 may lead to an even more egregious
result. By compelling claimants under NAFTA to prospectively
relinquish their rights to any local adjudication of claims based on
measures, which in actuality may not rise to the level of stating
NAFTA claims, the Article 1121 waiver has the potential to spark
substantial opportunity costs related to arbitrations under NAFTA.
Whether a claimant bears the risks of incurring such costs depends on
whether an arbitral tribunal, in determining the validity of a tendered
waiver, takes into consideration or disregards the substantive merits
of the claims brought by the claimant under NAFTA. In Waste
Management, the majority chose to forgo an analysis on the merits of
Waste Management in the Mexican courts was far below the amount sought in the
NAFTA arbitration-specifically, by a margin of approximately 23%. Id. at 255 n.29
(Highet, Arb., dissenting). Rough calculations of the amounts claimed indicate that
Waste Management claimed approximately US$28,339,343 in the local forums,
whereas the amount claimed in the NAFTA arbitration totaled about US$36,630,000,
leaving a difference of some $8,290,657. Id. (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
144. See id. at 253 (Highet, Arb., dissenting).
145. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1121, 32 I.L.M. at 643; Part I.B.2.
146. See supra Part I.A.3.
147. See Waste Mgmt., 15 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 239-40.
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Waste Management's claims for expropriation and unfair and
inequitable treatment and did even not consider whether they rose to
the level of stating NAFTA causes of action based on the underlying
measures of breach of contract and nonpayment. 4 ' The majority
instead presumed that they were the equivalent of NAFTA claims
and, upon comparison with Waste Management's local claims,
concluded that their coexistence constituted conduct prohibited by
Article 1121 because they arose from the same measures. 4 9 Highet, in
his dissent, emphasized the existence of fundamental differences
between NAFTA claims such as expropriation and unfair and
inequitable treatment, and non-NAFTA claims such as breach of
contract and nonpayment, and argued that concurrent proceedings
based on such claims did not violate Article 1121 since they were
substantively different. 5 '
This part analyzes the outcome in Waste Management and
concludes that, although the majority was justified in its ultimate
result of barring Waste Management from NAFTA arbitration, its
reasoning in reaching such a result was faulty in that it promotes the
problematic approach of applying the Article 1121 waiver
prospectively. Rather than examining the validity of Article 1121
waivers based merely on presumptions, this part argues that the
application of the waivers should turn on actual factual inquiries
regarding the merits of the claims made under NAFIA. A
retrospective approach would afford NAFTA claimants protection
against preclusion from subsequent local litigation in the event that
their claims are eventually deemed to be excluded from NAFTA
jurisdiction due to substantive shortcomings.
A. Identifying the Problems of the Prospective Approach: Analysis of
Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States
The majority in Waste Management was justified in blocking Waste
Management from further arbitrating under NAFTA.151 As the
majority correctly stated, the alleged breaches of contract and
nonpayment of invoices claimed by Waste Management at the local
level against Banobras and Acapulco comprised the same measures of
wrongdoing which formed the bases for its claims against Mexico
under NAFTA for expropriation and unfair and inequitable
treatment. z Although Highet in his dissent contended that a
fundamental difference exists between such claims as breach of
contract and nonpayment, which are creatures of local commercial
law, and claims for expropriation and inequitable treatment, which
148. See supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
149. See supra text accompanying note 123.
150. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 123, 128.
152- See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
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originate from international obligations of Mexico under NAFA,53
this rationale is problematic. Regardless of which body of law,
Mexican commercial law or the provisions of NAFTA, gave rise to
Waste Management's claims in the local forums and in the NAFTA
arbitration, the fact remains that the underlying bases for those claims
originated from the same root. If two sets of claims, otherwise based
on identical facts, were deemed substantively distinct just by virtue of
having separate legal origins, any crafty claimant would be able to
avoid preclusion under Article 1121 by carefully articulating his or her
grievances according to the legal principles recognized in each forum.
For example, an action for the tort of conversion of property arising
under the laws of Mexico could readily be transformed into a claim
for expropriation' under NAFTA without triggering Article 1121
preclusion because they arise from different bodies of law and,
therefore under Highet's rationale, would be treated as substantively
distinct. This would undermine the essential function of Article 1121
to prevent claimants from pursuing double remedies based on the
same facts.155 Thus, the majority rightly found that the coexistence of
Waste Management's local claims and its NAFTA claims amounted to
conduct prohibited by Article 1121 because they arose from the same
alleged measures of wrongdoing. 156
However justified the majority was in concluding that Waste
Management's duplicate claims constituted conduct violating Article
1121, its line of reasoning in arriving at such a result is suspect and
exposes the dangers of applying the Article 1121 waiver prospectively.
One of the key issues the majority addressed in analyzing the validity
of the Article 1121 waiver tendered by Waste Management was
whether to explore the merits of Waste Management's claims under
NAFTA.157 The majority elected to ignore the substantive merits of
Waste Management's claims for expropriation and unfair and
inequitable treatment since the issue of the Article 1121 waiver
pertained only to a jurisdictional condition precedent to NAFTA
arbitration as contrasted from the actual heart of the arbitration
itself.158 According to the majority, the relevant point of comparison
in determining if Waste Management's dual proceedings constituted
conduct prohibited by Article 1121 was "the presumed or supposed [as
opposed to actual] violations of NAFTA invoked by the Claimant and
153. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
154. Recall that the term "expropriation" in general has been equated with the
concept of a "taking" or appropriation by the host country of an investor's investment
or property. See supra note 16. For further analysis on the term "expropriation" as
used by various arbitral panels in general, see also infra notes 162-68 and
accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 124-28.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 123, 128.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
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the actions effectively in progress before other courts or tribunals at
that time." 1 9
Under this line of reasoning, the only way Waste Management
could have proceeded with NAFTA arbitration would have been to
effectively waive its rights to maintain its local proceedings even
without the assurance that its NAFTA claims would be actionable on
their merits. That is, Waste Management would have had to tender a
waiver under Article 1121 that would have taken effect prospectively
against all subsequent local litigation irrespective of whether its
NAFTA claims eventually failed to state a NAFTA cause of action.
Under this approach, a party in the position of Waste Management
must bear the significant risk of having no alternative means of
recourse in the event its NAFTA claims did fail, since the waiver had
already taken effect before the merits of the party's NAFTA claims
were considered. Of course, on the contrary, the party's NAFTA
claims may very well turn out to have legitimate status under
NAFTA, in which case the prospective application of the Article 1121
waiver would not cause any harm. Nevertheless, until the tribunal
determines in one way or another the legitimacy of the party's
NAFTA claims, the risk of such harm would still linger and cause the
party much unrest, especially since the issue of what constitutes an
actionable NAFTA claim is often unsettled, as shown below.
Taking, for instance, the claim for expropriation made by Waste
Management, it is far from clear, much less a presumable fact,"&
whether the threshold for such a claim under NAFTA would be
satisfied by alleging measures of breach of contract by Banobras and
Acapulco.16' In fact, the meaning of the term "expropriation,"
whether as intended in NAFTA or as used in other international
jurisdictions, is still the subject of much controversy and debate. 62
This is due in large part to the lack of guidance provided in NAFTA
on the meaning of "expropriation,"'" and the scarcity of judicial or
arbitral authority on the question of defining "expropriation" in
general.' 64
Some tribunals treat the concept of expropriation as the equivalent
of a taking or appropriation by the State of property owned by a
159. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 15 ICSID Rev.:
Foreign Investment L.J. 214, 235 (2000), available at
http://www.worldbank.orglicsid/cases/awards.htm (emphasis added).
160. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
162. See Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110- Can Regulation Be Erpropriation?,
5 NAFTA: L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 499, 519 (1999) ("Nearly every scholar who has
attempted to map the definition of 'indirect expropriation' or 'compensable takings'
in international law has concluded that it is rife with ambiguity.").
163. See iL at 510.
164. See id. at 514.
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foreigner.65 Under this view, an expropriation may take the form of a
compulsory transfer of rights to the property of a foreigner by the
State.166 Other tribunals define the term "expropriation" as a
deprivation of interest in the property of a foreigner caused by the
State.167 While the concept of "taking" embodies the actor's point of
view, requiring that something be affirmatively acquired by the State,
"deprivation" appears to represent the opposite viewpoint of the
aggrieved investor, requiring only that some property right has been
impaired or lost. 168 Depending on which definitional standard a given
165. See Allahyar Mouri, The International Law of Expropriation as Reflected in
the Work of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 66 (1994) ("The synonymity of the terms
,expropriation' and 'taking'... appears to have been understood in a number of
awards and separate opinions."); see also Eric N. Baklanoff, Expropriation of U.S.
Investments in Cuba, Mexico, and Chile 2 (1975) (defining "expropriation" as the
process by which a State appropriates a private property right of an individual in
order to further a public purpose). Tribunals rely on decisions of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, which was responsible for overseeing the most abundant body
of investor-State arbitration proceedings ever handled, as an important authority on
the international law of expropriation. See Banks, supra note 162, at 514. The
Tribunal's prominence in this area can be traced back to the overthrow of the Shah of
Iran in 1979, which was followed by a rapid proliferation of claims for compensation
by investors of both the United States and Iran with regard to their properties
respectively expropriated in each country. See id.
166. See Banks, supra note 162, at 516 (discussing Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987), in which the alleged "taking" consisted of the
Iranian government's unilateral annulment of an oil exploitation agreement made
with United States-based Amoco).
167. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, 67-71 (July 20)
(analyzing the possibility of an expropriation where the Italian government caused a
significant deprivation of the interest of a United States investor in its property by
requisitioning its plant facilities which subsequently went bankrupt). But see Mouri,
supra note 165, at 65-67 (criticizing as a mistake the view expressed in some opinions
and awards rendered in arbitration that "expropriation" was synonymous with
"deprivation").
168. See Mouri, supra note 165, at 67. Whether understood to mean a "taking" or
"deprivation" of property interests, the concept of "expropriation" is analogous to
both a "compulsory sale," often implemented in nineteenth-century England with
respect to public utilities, and the American theory of eminent domain. See B. A.
Wortley, Expropriation in Public International Law 2 (1959). While title to property
acquired by the government in a "compulsory sale" may eventually revert to the
owner upon the exercise of its right to repurchase after the property's public function
expires, title obtained over property seized under eminent domain is new and
separate from the owner's old title and therefore vests absolutely in the State. Id.
With regard to both doctrines, owners of the seized properties nevertheless enjoyed
certain protections against the abuse by States of such powers to "expropriate." Id.
The protections in the United States originated from Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional provisions based on theories of fundamental rights to "due process"
and, earlier, in the Fifth Amendment "takings" clause, which states that no "private
property [shall] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Samy Friedman,
Expropriation in International Law 8 (1953) (quoting the Fifth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution); see also Wortley, supra, at 2 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution). In England, the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845,
which created the aforementioned system of expropriation for public utility
undertakings, provided important protections for the owner of the acquired property.
Wortley, supra, at 2. This explains the presence of similar conditions and safeguards
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tribunal applies, the merits of an expropriation claim could vary from
case to case, leaving much room for confusion and speculation.
Equally as obscure is the issue of what kind of property or property
rights could be subjected to expropriation, in particular, it is unclear
whether measures of breach of contract may constitute a valid claim
for expropriation, as the majority in Waste Management presumed.
Some tribunals hold that property rights subject to expropriation by
States include not only tangible and physical assets but also intangible
interests in property such as contractual rights.'69 In Mobil Oil Iran
Inc. v. Iran,7 ' the alleged expropriation consisted of a law passed by
Iran that virtually nullified a sale and purchase agreement on crude
oil, revoking the rights of various multinational oil companies to
purchase oil from the National Iranian Oil Company.' The tribunal
opined that a contractual right could qualify as an object of
expropriation by a State.Y2 Similarly, in Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v.
Iran,173  the interests of the Claimant which were allegedly
expropriated extended from the contractual right to explore and
exploit oil resources in designated offshore areas pursuant to a (Joint
Structure Agreement).17 4  In this respect the tribunal noted that
"expropriation... gives rise under international law to liability for
compensation... whether the property is tangible, such as real estate
or a factory, or intangible, such as the contract rights involved in the
present Case."175 Such reasoning lends support to the majority's
presumption in Waste Management that the alleged breach of contract
measures committed by the Mexican entities would suffice to state a
claim for expropriation.
As expected, however, not everyone so readily embraces the notion
that breaches of contract constitute claims of expropriation. Even
when the concept of property rights is extended to its widest limit,
some scholars nonetheless exclude contractual rights from those
groups of rights and objects which could be expropriated."', While
against the abuse of expropriatory powers by States in the law governing the
international arena, including the NAFTA, which requires such key elements as
"public purpose," "non-discriminatory basis," "due process of law," and "payment of
compensation." See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1110, 32 I.LM. at 641(provision on expropriation); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
§ 712 (1987) (requiring that a "taking" be for a public purpose, be non-discriminatory,
and be accompanied by just compensation).
169. See Mouri, supra note 165, at 39.
170. 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1987).
171. Id. at 10.
172 Id. at 25. The tribunal, however, chose not to analyze the issue further since
the act of expropriation alleged by the claimant was not the law passed by the Iranian
government but a letter sent to the Mobil consortium by the National Iranian Oil
Company that had no effect of affirmatively repudiating the agreement. Id. at 44.
173. 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 79 (1989).
174. Id. at 81.
175. Id at 106.
176. See Friedman, supra note 168, at 148 (indicating that even when taking the
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certain incorporeal rights with respect to "industrial, literary and
artistic property" are subject to expropriation,177 contractual rights in
themselves call for separate treatment and do not touch on the
character of expropriation.17 Similar to Highet in Waste Management,
those commentators who express this view argue that contracts have
no place in international disputes due to the lack of rules regarding
their form and legal effect in international law."9 Furthermore, the
essential principle supporting a contract is that the parties mutually
assented to their obligations and rights, and by virtue of entering into
such an agreement, the foreigner has showcased its confidence in the
State and its intent to submit to the national system of
jurisprudence.' In the case of expropriation, on the other hand, the
State is imposing a unilateral measure on the foreigner in taking, or
depriving the foreigner of, his rights to certain property without his
consent.'
18
One case in particular, Azinian v. United Mexican States,"s affirms
this restrictive stance on contractual rights specifically in connection
with expropriation under NAFTA. In Azinian, a group of United
States investors in a Mexican corporate entity claimed damages for
expropriation under Article 1110 of NAFTA,183 derived from the
alleged breach of a concession contract by the City of Naucalpan in
Mexico."8 The City Council annulled the concession contract, which
term "property" subject to expropriation in its "widest sense," which might suggest an
inclusion of intangible rights, there is still "the exception of contractual rights").
177. Id.
178. See id. at 156. This view does not foreclose the possibility, however, that
certain countries may expressly provide in treaties the power of international
tribunals to deal with contractual rights. As one commentator states: "But apart from
express provisions of this kind, it would seem that a contract cannot directly form the
basis of an international claim, which suffices to exclude it from the field of
expropriation." Id.
179. See id.; cf. Levin & Main, supra note 53, at 97 (stating that to plainly expand
the term "expropriation" in Chapter 11 "to reach ordinary breaches of contract would
be directly contrary to conventional international law"). Furthermore, in the context
of the NAFTA, adopting the view that contractual breaches would constitute an
expropriation would create an inherent danger by providing an additional basis by
which investors, under the guise of the NAFTA, could freely challenge various
measures and acts of a State, including legitimate ones. See Lawrence Herman,
Ottawa Won Big in the NAFTA Decision Against Pope & Talbot, Globe & Mail, Jun.
30, 2000, at Bl. This would jeopardize the credibility and soundness of the entire
NAFTA framework. Id.
180. See Friedman, supra note 168, at 156-57.
181. Id. at 157.
182. (U.S. v. Mex.), 14 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. 538 (1999).
183. Id. at 559. The investors also claimed that by virtue of its municipality
canceling the concession contract, Mexico failed to accord their "investments...
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security," NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1105, 32 I.L.M. at
639, under Article 1105 of the NAFTA. Azinian, 14 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment
L.J. at 559.
184. Azinian, 14 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. at 545. The value of the
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pertained to waste disposal and collection in the city,"f due to the
presence of some "irregularities" in connection with the conclusion
and performance of the agreement."" The annulment of the contract
was later upheld in the courts of Mexico,"s leaving arbitration under
NAFTA as the final means of recourse for the claimants. Although
the Azinian tribunal did entertain the concept that a "confiscatory"
breach or a breach that destroyed "contractual rights as an asset"
could rise to the level of an expropriation by a State,s it inevitably
resorted to the general rule that "NAFTA does not... allow investors
to seek international arbitration for mere contractual breaches."s9 The
Court stated, "NAFTA cannot possibly be read to create such a
regime, which would have elevated a multitude of ordinary
transactions with public authorities into potential international
disputes.""19
As shown above, a substantial discrepancy exists with regard to the
issue of contractual rights as included in property which could be
investments at issue was estimated to range from US$11,600,000 to USS19,203,000,
depending on the method and criteria used to evaluate the losses. Id. at 559-60.
185. Id at 541,543.
186. Id at 543. In particular, the Council expressed concern about the absence of a
number of new front-load vehicles that were provided for in the contract. Id. at 542.
187. Id at 543 (outlining the progression of unsuccessful legal challenges made
against the annulment of the concession contract, starting with the initial proceedings
brought before the State Administrative Tribunal, then before the Superior Chamber
of the Administrative Tribunal, and, lastly, before the Federal Circuit Court).
188. See id at 564-65. Indeed, certain United States writers have recognized an
exception to their view that contracts should be excluded from the field of
expropriation in the case of confiscatory breaches of contracts. Friedman, supra note
168, at 157. Certain breaches of contract, according to this view, are of such "gravity"
that they rise to the level of expropriation, making the breaching State internationally
accountable. Id. Most of the cases upon which the writers have relied in support of
such an exception, however, deal with instances where no local remedy was available
for breach of contract, or where a denial of justice against the application of the
foreigner for relief was apparent without having to engage local channels. Id.
189. Azinian, 14 ICSID Rev.: Foreign Investment LJ. at 564 (emphasis added). At
the very least, the tribunal considered it crucial to analyze more deeply whether in
fact the breach of contract at issue was of such magnitude as to overcome this firmly
established general rule. See id. at 565. It stated:
The words "confiscatory," "destroy contractual rights as an asset," or
"repudiation" may serve as a way to describe breaches which are to be
treated as extraordinary, and therefore as acts of expropriation, but they
certainly do not indicate on what basis the critical distinction between
expropriation and an ordinary breach of contract is to be made. The
egregiousness of any breach is in the eye of the beholder-and that is not
satisfactory for present purposes.
It is therefore necessary to examine whether the annulment of the
Concession Contract may be considered to be an act of expropriation
violating NAFTA Article 1110.... The question cannot be more central.
Id
190. Id. at 564 (treating as problematic the claimants' fundamental complaint
supporting their claim for expropriation "that they are the victims of a breach of the
Concession Contract").
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subject to expropriation, 91 and still further ambiguity lies in
determining the general scope of the term "expropriation."'" The
view that a given arbitral tribunal chooses will most likely turn on its
analysis of the facts and circumstances surrounding the merits of each
case under review.193  As it currently stands, Waste Management
requires NAFTA claimants to blindly waive their rights to subsequent
local proceedings or to discontinue pending proceedings without the
benefit of knowing which position the tribunal will take on the issue of
whether breaches of contract constitute expropriations under
NAFTA. This presents a great and unnecessary risk to the NAFTA
claimant of being left without a remedy in the event the tribunal
asserts the position that breaches of contract fall outside the scope of
expropriation and, therefore, of NAFTA jurisdiction. The Waste
Management tribunal should have clearly indicated how it would
handle the merits of a claim such as expropriation based on
contractual breaches before deciding on the validity of the Article
1121 waiver submitted by Waste Management. Therefore, to the
extent it ignored completely the merits of Waste Management's
NAFTA claims in its analysis of the Article 1121 waiver, 94 the
majority's reasoning in Waste Management was faulty and reveals
some troublesome aspects about the prospective application of
waivers. 19
5
191. See supra notes 169-90 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
193. For instance, the sufficiency of a breach of contract forming the basis of an
expropriation claim might well depend on whether the government entity in breach
was "motivated primarily by political or commercial considerations." Levin & Marin,
supra note 53, at 98. A finding of such political motivation behind the cancellation of
a contract might indicate a stronger case that the wrongful cancellation amounts to an
expropriation for which the breaching State should be held responsible under the
NAFTA. See id. Another consideration might be whether there is evidence showing
bad faith on the part of the breaching State. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States § 712 cmt. h (stating that a State's repudiation of a
contract is not a violation of the international law of expropriation if such repudiation
was based on a "bona fide dispute" about the obligations under the contract). Cf
Banks, supra note 162, at 519 (exploring the possibility that a breach of contract has
sufficient economic impact on the value of an investor's property to rise to the level of
prompting a claim for expropriation).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
195. Given the fact that Article 1121 precludes subsequent litigation on the same
issues, an interesting question to ask would be what effects, if any, the provision
would have in the reverse-namely, with regard to prior litigation on the same issues.
William S. Dodge, National Courts and International Arbitration: Exhaustion of
Remedies and Res Judicata Under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, 23 Hastings Int'l &
Comp. L. Rev. 357, 376 (2000). Would Article 1121 also take effect retroactively to
preclude claimants from raising those issues before a NAFTA tribunal which had
already been decided in a national forum? See id. at 371. One scholar suggests that
the answer is "no," but argues that Chapter 11 should not be interpreted as
affirmatively "requiring a foreign investor to exhaust its local remedies before
bringing a claim before an international tribunal," which would be reminiscent of the
Calvo Doctrine as discussed in supra Part I.A.2. Dodge, supra, at 373-74, 383. He
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B. Mitigating the Opportunity Costs of Chapter 11 Arbitration:
An Argument for Retrospective Application of Article 1121
Highet wrote in his dissent:
Indeed, it would be an extreme price to pay in order to engage in
NAFTA arbitration for a NAFTA claimant to be forced to abandon
all local remedies relating to commercial law recoveries that could
have some bearing on its NAFTA claim-but which nonetheless
were not themselves NAFTA claims.196
As Highet correctly indicates, the Article 1121 waiver has the
potential to impose substantial opportunity costs on claimants for
arbitrating under Chapter 11 of NAFTA. As shown in Waste
Management, such opportunity costs are especially evident when the
Article 1121 waiver is given effect prospectively," without any
inquiry into the merits of the claims submitted in the NAFTA
arbitration.198 According to this approach, investors must either run
the risk that their claims might later be deemed to have questionable
substantive validity under NAFTA and nevertheless preclude
themselves from subsequent local litigation by submitting the waiver,
or refrain from NAFTA arbitration altogether. Investors who choose
to bear the risk are left at the mercy of tribunals who may later decide
that their claims do not rise to the level of stating NAFTA causes of
action, in which case they would have no alternative means of legal
redress since their waivers have already taken effect. In borderline
cases, where material questions of fact exist as to whether claims
brought by investors in NAFTA arbitration actually do rise to the
level of stating legitimate NAFTA causes of action, the risk of
incurring such opportunity costs becomes imminent. This type of
danger is already illustrated by the nature of the claims at issue in
Waste Management for expropriation based on breaches of contract
and the variety of ways a given tribunal might decide on the merits of
such claims. 99
Not only would such opportunity costs in themselves place an
onerous burden upon participants in NAFTA arbitration, but they
would also greatly offend the very purpose of Chapter 11 to assure
further argued that although Article 1121 did not impose such a requirement of
exhaustion of local remedies, the local forums still provided a viable and valuable
means for dispute resolution, and thus, the "NAFTA tribunals should not... treat
domestic court decisions as res judicata for fear of discouraging" their use. Dodge,
supra, at 382-83.
196. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 15 ICSID Rev.:
Foreign Investment LJ. 214, 260 (2000) (Highet, Arb., dissenting) (emphasis added),
available at http'//www.worldbank.orgricsid/casesawards.htm.
197. See idL at 229 (stating that the point at which the Article 1121 waiver of Waste
Management took effect was upon its submission at the outset of the NAFTA
proceedings).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
199. See supra notes 160-94 and accompanying text.
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investors "due process before an impartial tribunal. '20  Chapter 11
would no longer function effectively to provide a safe harbor for
aggrieved investors to resolve their claims free from the multitude of
problems and risks often associated with local litigation. 0' As
discouraged investors, unwilling to bear such burdensome costs of
NAFTA litigation, turn back to local forums with their attendant
delays and uncertainties, 202 remnants of the archaic Calvo Doctrine2 3
would again emerge, compromising the stable environment for
investment generated by NAFTA as a whole. °4
To minimize the risk of potential NAFTA claimants incurring such
extraordinary costs of engaging in NAFTA arbitration, the Article
1121 waiver should take effect not prospectively, but retrospectively.
That is, the Article 1121 waiver should take effect only after a
preliminary finding that the claims submitted by an aggrieved investor
are indeed the substantive equivalent of NAFTA claims. This
preliminary inquiry would not taint the policy rationale behind Article
1121 against duplication of proceedings,205 since the waiver would still
function effectively to prevent an overlap of claims that are "not
different in substance.206 More importantly, such an inquiry before
the application of Article 1121 would neutralize the egregious
opportunity costs mentioned earlierl°  by protecting NAFTA
claimants whose claims are later determined not to be actionable
under NAFTA. Under this approach, such claimants would have
preserved their rights to revert to the local forums with respect to
those claims which did not fall within the purview of NAFTA, since
the Article 1121 waiver would never have taken effect.
As seen in the previous section with regard to expropriation claims
based on contractual rights, not all measures constitute NAFTA
claims, and at the very least, their substantive similarities or
dissimilarities may only be determined through extensive factual
scrutiny.2° For instance, the Waste Management tribunal should have
200. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
201. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
202. See supra text accompanying note 70.
203. See supra Part I.A.2.
204. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27.
206. See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 15 ICSID
Rev.: Foreign Investment L.J. 214, 244 (2000) (Highet, Arb., dissenting), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
207. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text. Proponents of juridical
economy might suggest that requiring extensive factual scrutiny before implementing
Article 1121 would deprive the NAFTA arbitration process of one of its must valued
attributes-expediency. See Doak Bishop, The United States' Perspective Toward
International Arbitration With Latin American Parties, 8 Int'l L. Practicum 63, 67
(1995) (describing international arbitration as "generally quicker" than more
conventional modes of litigation); Camp, Binding Arbitration, supra note 5, at 728-29
(emphasizing that, in addition to being "faster and more expeditious," arbitration also
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reviewed those significant questions of fact which existed as to
whether measures of breach of contract and nonpayment on invoices
were substantively sufficient bases for expropriation :° and unfair and
inequitable treatment claims under NAFTA.' Only upon a positive
finding would the Article 1121 waiver have taken effect to preclude
Waste Management from participating in subsequent proceedings on
the local level with respect to the measures at issue in NAFTA
arbitration. Until such a determination is made by the tribunal, Waste
Management's proceedings pending in the local forums would have
been preserved and not treated as violations of Article 1121. In such
manner, the retrospective approach would alleviate, if not eliminate,
any opportunity costs of investors seeking to arbitrate under NAFTA.
Therefore, the retrospective approach, applying the Article 1121
waiver only after preliminary inquiries are made as to the substance of
the claims submitted by a NAFTA claimant, should be adopted.
CONCLUSION
The signing of NAFTA represents a remarkable turning point in
the course of dealings between the United States and Mexico,21 which
for decades had advocated contrasting ideologies with regard to
foreign investment policy 212 under diplomatic protection" 3 and the
Calvo Doctrine.214  How the two countries ever reached common
ground with regard to the international standards set forth in
NAFTA, and in particular, those provisions in Chapter 11 governing
investments and the resolution of investment disputes, is truly a
wonder, considering such a long history of conflict. By establishing a
comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism based on international
legal principles, Chapter 11 effectively puts to rest the doubts and
suspicion which investors from the United States previously had vith
respect to the investment climate in Mexico.215 Operating under such
notions as "international reciprocity and due process before an
offers parties the flexibility to draft arbitration clauses containing specific time
restraints to which the arbitration proceedings must adhere). Admittedly, a rapid
resolution of disputes is desirable in that parties may avoid substantial hindrances in
conducting their ongoing businesses due to lagging court proceedings coupled with
costly and time-consuming discovery. See Camp, Binding Arbitration, supra note 5, at
729. Nevertheless, sacrificing judicial expediency is a relatively small cost compared
to the drastic price claimants would otherwise have to pay to pursue NAFTA
arbitration in waiving their rights prospectively to alternative means of recovery even
without the benefit of knowing whether their claims have factually sufficient bases for
consideration under the NAFTA.
209. See supra note 95.
210. See supra note 94.
211. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 6.
213. See supra Part I.A.1.
214. See supra Part I.A.2.
215. See supra Part I.A.3.
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impartial tribunal, 1 16 combined with giving individual investors the
power to bring claims directly against host countries, 217 Chapter 11
officially buries the ideals and practices that once existed under the
Calvo Doctrine and diplomatic protection.1 8
However, even such a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism
as the one in Chapter 11 would serve little use to an aggrieved
investor if the process of accessing the mechanism entails the hurdling
of latent pitfalls and assuming hidden opportunity costs.2 1 9 This Note
highlights one such danger involved in submitting a claim under
Chapter 11 by analyzing the Waste Management tribunal's application
and analysis of the Article 1121 waiver provision.220 The tribunal
based its determination that Waste Management's waiver was invalid
on presumptions, rather than actual findings of fact, that Waste
Management's allegations of breach of contract were substantively
sufficient to state a cause of action for expropriation under NAFTA.221
Such an approach of applying the Article 1121 waiver prospectively,
without regard to the merits of the investor's claims as violations of
NAFTA, is problematic when considering that the general scope of
such claims as expropriation, especially with respect to contractual
rights,2 22 is marred with ambiguity.223  Even despite looming
uncertainties as to whether their claims will constitute causes of action
under NAFTA, investors are compelled from the outset under Article
1121 to waive their rights to any later recourse with respect to such
claims.224 This creates enormous opportunity costs for those investors
who wish to partake in the benefits of NAFTA arbitration. z Surely,
the NAFTA Parties could not have intended such a drastic result,
which would also undoubtedly undermine the integrity of the Chapter
11 dispute resolution framework to assure investors "due process
before an impartial tribunal. 2 26
Instead of applying the waiver prospectively as was done in Waste
Management, the better approach would be a retrospective
application, where the waiver would only take effect after a
preliminary inquiry is made establishing that the investor's claims do
amount to NAFTA claims in substance. Under such an approach, the
investor's rights to access local proceedings would be preserved in the
event its claims made in NAFTA arbitration are found not to be
216. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
217. See id. ch. 11, arts. 1116, 1117, 32 I.L.M. at 642-43.
218. See supra Part I.A.3.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 196-204.
220. See supra Parts II.B, II.C.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
222. See supra notes 169-90 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 197.
225. See supra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
226. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, art. 1115, 32 I.L.M. at 642.
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actionable under NAFTA, since the Article 1121 waiver would never
have taken effect. This would minimize, if not eliminate, such
opportunity costs of investors who seek to engage in NA.FTA
arbitration. This Note therefore suggests an alternative method of
applying Article 1121 to that forwarded in Waste Management in
order to preserve most effectively the framework of Chapter 11 and
NAFTA as a whole.
Notes & Observations
